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Machiavellianism has been considered in the literature as the symbol for manipulative 
strategies in social conduct. However, it has been rarely studied via behavioural experiments 
outside the laboratory, in more naturalistic settings. We report the first behavioural study 
(N=490) evaluating whether Machiavellian individuals, high Machs, deceive more than low 
Machs in online poker, where deception is ethically acceptable and strategically beneficial. 
Specifically, we evaluated Machiavellianism, bluffing patterns, and emotional sensitivity to 
getting “slow-played” (“stepping into a trap”). Bluffing was assessed by realistic poker tasks 
wherein participants made decisions to bluff or not, and sensitivity to slow-play by a self-
report measure. We found that high Machs had higher average bluffsizes than low Machs 
(but not higher bluffing frequency) and were more distraught by getting slow-played. The 
Machiavellian sub-trait “desire for control” also positively predicted bluffing frequency. We 
show that online poker can be utilized to investigate the psychology of deception and 
Machiavellianism. The results also illustrate a conceptual link between unethical and ethical 
types of deception, as Machiavellianism is implicated in both. 












Deception refers to acts that propagate beliefs of things that are not true, or not the 
whole truth. It is an integral part of human behaviour, having co-evolved with cooperation 
when our ancestors manipulated the beliefs of others to obtain mates and resources, and to 
avoid direct conflicts (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005).  
Some forms of human deception are considered to be more ethically acceptable than 
others, such as benign daily white lies (a lie in order not to hurt another person) compared 
with malicious large-scale frauds. However, regardless of their scale or form, acts of 
deception are often viewed in a negative light. Also most scientific research on human 
deception has focused on its “darker” side. For example, research on individual variation in 
deceptive behaviour has emphasized the role of the so-called “dark triad” personality traits – 
namely, psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism (e.g. Jones & Paulhus, 2011). Of 
these, Machiavellianism is particularly salient in deceptive behaviour: Individuals with high 
Machiavellianistic tendencies (“high Machs”) engage in amoral and deceptive manipulation, 
tend to seek control over others and to gain status for themselves (Christie & Geis, 1970; 
Dahling, Whitaker, & Levy, 2009). High Machs view human nature in an overly cynical 
manner, and to them, the end often justifies the means. 
More specifically, high Machs, compared with low Machs, have been found to be less 
ethical (Hegarty & Sims, 1978), better liars (Geis & Moon, 1981), more likely to cheat when 
the likelihood of getting caught is low (Cooper & Peterson, 1980), and more likely to engage 
in fraudulent financial reporting (Murphy, 2012). However, recently Jonason et al. (2014) 
found that high Machs reported telling more lies (of any type) and white lies than low Machs, 






This view of high Machs as strategic manipulators is consistent with the study by 
Jones and Paulhus (2011) evaluating the associations between impulsivity and the dark triad 
traits: whereas psychopathy and narcissism were associated with increased impulsivity, 
Machiavellianism was not, which the authors argued allowed “Machiavellians to refrain from 
counterproductive behaviours despite their selfish intentions”. Along the same line, both 
psychopathy and Machiavellianism were found to be positively associated with cheating in 
university (e.g., plagiarism), but this association was weaker for Machiavellianism (Williams, 
Nathanson, & Paulhus, 2010). Ostensibly, lacking the impulsivity of psychopaths, high 
Machs more prudently attend to the possible negative consequences of cheating. According 
to this view, high Machs’ deceptive and sometimes amoral tendencies are primarily driven by 
strategic calculations. 
To better understand the psychology of deception and Machiavellianism, it is 
worthwhile to evaluate the conceptual similarities and differences between socially 
condemnable and acceptable forms of deception. Although high Machs are more deceptive 
and manipulative in real life than low Machs, it is not well understood whether this tendency 
transfers to contexts where deception is not only morally acceptable but also strategically 
beneficial. If high Machs deceive and manipulate mainly for strategic reasons, they should be 
more likely than low Machs to deceive also in such morally acceptable contexts. 
One way to shed light on this issue is to study how Machiavellianism influences 
behaviour in economic games, which allow evaluating various aspects of strategic decision-
making. Unfortunately, not many such studies have been reported. In trust games1, high 
Machs were more likely than low Machs to distrust their co-players (Burks, Carpenter, & 
Verhoogen, 2003) and less likely to reciprocate trust (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & Smith, 
																																								 																				
1 In two-player trust games, one player sends to the other some amount of resources, which are then multiplied 





2002; Bereczkei et al., 2013). Spitzer et al. (2007) found that when there was no fear of 
punishment for unfair resource allocations, high Machs defected more than low Machs. 
Finally, in the one-shot ultimatum game, high Machs behaved more “rationally” than low 
Machs by accepting unfair offers more frequently2, but resisted exploitation in the iterated 
version of the game (Meyer, 1992). 
Most economic games entail some ecological validity concerns, being oversimplified 
for “laboratory-convenience”. These games cannot fully model real-life behaviour. Previous 
studies have also not evaluated how Machiavellianism is linked to strategic deception in a 
naturalistic setting; it has been noted that tasks to induce deception in such settings are very 
challenging or even impossible to design (Book et al., 2006; Jonason et al., 2014). 
Poker offers a platform for observing strategic deception in a naturalistic 
environment. Poker is played frequently by a hundred million people worldwide, most 
notably online. It is a game of incomplete information where some cards are known to the 
players only, but not to their opponents. No apparent ethical or social pressure prevents 
players from deceiving in poker; instead, deception is the norm in the game. Game-
theoretically, deception is also necessary to increase winning chances (Chen & Ankenman, 
2006). The most recognized form of deception in poker is bluffing, which refers to betting or 
raising (showing strength) with a weak hand (cf. glossary) to make the opponent fold (give 
up). Another form of poker deception is slow-playing (or trapping), which is roughly the 
opposite of bluffing: betting weakly or not at all with a very strong hand to “lure” the 
opponent into betting or raising with a weaker hand (luring someone into a trap). Both 
bluffing and slow-playing are strategies to increase the profitability of playing with weak 
																																								 																				
2 In the one-shot ultimatum game, two players divide a sum of money between them. The first player proposes a 
division (e.g., 60-40), which the second player either accepts or rejects. If the proposal is rejected, neither player 
receives anything. If it is accepted, the money is split accordingly. Rejecting any offer can be viewed as 





(bluffing) or strong (slow-playing) poker hands by inducing a false belief in one’s opponent 
about what cards the player is holding.  
Moreover, unlike most other economic games, poker decision-making has direct 
monetary implications for the players, which can be mathematically calculated (e.g. Palomäki 
et al., 2013). However, no previous study evaluated how individual differences in deceptive 
personality traits relate to these effects. The evidence linking Machiavellianism to strategic 
uses of deception (Jonason et al., 2014; Jones & Paulhus, 2011) suggests that individual 
differences in Machiavellianism might be reflected in different poker playing styles. If high 
Machs are strategic deceivers, they should be more likely than low Machs to bluff in online 
poker. We thus hypothesized that: 
H1a: High Machs bluff more frequently and H1b: bluff in higher amounts than low 
Machs in online poker.  
Similarly, Machiavellianism might be implicated also in slow-playing. In addition to 
being strategic deceivers, high Machs are sometimes referred to as true homines economici –
rational and “cold-blooded” gamesmen whose decisions are mostly unaffected by emotions 
(Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2003). Thus, high Machs, compared with low Machs, might feel less 
distraught by losing due to being “slow-played” against, because they are better able to 
control their emotions. We also hypothesized that: 
H2: High Machs are less emotionally sensitive than low Machs to situations in which 









 An online study including both behavioural and questionnaire-based measures was 
created with Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com) in English. Five hundred and fifty-eight 
participants were recruited from various international online poker web-forums. Based on a 
priori criteria, 56 (10%) participants were screened out due to insufficient skills in written 
English (skills not reported as “very good or better”). Twelve participants (2.2%) were also 
omitted due to extreme values in one dependent variable3. The final sample size was 490 (424 
[86.5%] males, 35 [7.1%] females, Mage = 30.00; SDage = 8.66, range: 16 – 67). Gender 
imbalance is typical in studies sampling poker playing populations (Palomäki et al., 2013). Of 
the participants, 108 (22.9%) had no college education, 127 (27%) had some college 
education but no degree, 136 (28.9%) held a bachelor’s degree, and 100 (21.3%) held a 
master’s degree or higher. On average, our participants reported an annual income between 
US$30.000 and $40.000 (ranging from below $20.000 [35.1%] to above $80.000 [11.2%]). 
Thirty-one participants (6.3%) had missing data on demographics. These participants were 
omitted from analyses where demographic data was controlled for. Participants were offered 
the possibility of taking part in a draw of five separate $50 Amazon.com gift coupons. This 
study was approved by the Newcastle University ethics committee. 
2.2 Procedure  
Participants first gave informed consent. Thereafter they filled in the Machiavellian 
Personality Scale, and three exploratory measures (including measures of poker experience, 
and masculine traits such as competitiveness and assertiveness; consult the Supplementary 
Materials section for details), followed by behavioural bluffing tasks, a scale measuring 
																																								 																				





sensitivity to slow-play, and demographics. Participants were to make bet / do not bet (i.e., 
bluff / do not bluff) decisions in four individual simulated bluffing tasks, in which they were 
“sitting” at an online poker table with four opponents represented by avatars and the names 
“Opponent 1– 4” (see Dependent variables)4. The bluffing tasks were presented in random 
order. 
2.3 Materials 
2.3.1 Machiavellian Personality Scale (MPS). This 16-item scale conceptualizes 
Machiavellianism as individual propensity to distrust others, engage in amoral manipulation, 
seek control over others and status for oneself (Dahling et al., 2009). The MPS has 4 
subscales, each including 3-5 items. All items are anchored from 1 (“Completely disagree”) 
to 7 (“Completely agree”). The subscale labels are: Amorality (“I am willing to be unethical if 
I believe it will help me succeed”; M = 2.69, SD = 1.13, range = 1 – 6.2; Cronbach's α	= .68), 
Desire for Control (“I enjoy having control over other people”; M = 4.31, SD = 1.30, range = 
1 – 7; Cronbach's α = .77), Desire for Status (“Status is a good sign of success in life”; M = 
4.08, SD = 1.45, range = 1 – 7; Cronbach's α = .82), and Distrust of Others (“If I show any 
weakness at work, other people will take advantage of it”; M = 3.05, SD = 1.14, range = 1 – 
6.4; Cronbach's α = .79). The entire 16-item scale was normally distributed and had a 
satisfactory inter-item reliability (M = 3.37, SD = 0.83, range = 1 – 5.75; Cronbach’s α = .85). 
We used the MPS instead of the more conventional Mach-IV scale (Christie & Geis, 
1970). Studies employing Mach-IV have reported inconsistent scale reliabilities and 
dimensional structures for the instrument, but MPS showed promise in fixing these issues. 
																																								 																				
4 The study included also an experimental manipulation, where participants were randomly assigned across three 
conditions. The bluffing tasks were taken at a table with 1) gender mixed (two female and two male), 2) all 
male, or 3) all female avatar opponents. This manipulation was aimed at evaluating hypotheses unrelated to the 
current aims, and these results will be reported elsewhere. Including this manipulation into statistical models as 





Moreover, many of the items in the MPS have to do with striving for status and success, 
accumulating wealth, and enjoying having control over others. Such items (which the Mach-
IV scale does not cover) are particularly salient for poker players: The stereotypical 
successful poker player has money and status, and less successful poker players strive to get 
there. Success in poker, in turn, requires manipulating others, or “controlling the action” 
(pulling the strings) in the game itself. 
2.3.3 Dependent variables. Three dependent variables (DVs) were employed in this 
study. Two DVs were behavioural measures of bluffing, and one DV was a questionnaire 
instrument to measure emotional sensitivity to slow-play. 
2.3.3.1 Bluffing measures. Participants undertook four simulated online poker 
bluffing tasks involving the most popular poker variant, No Limit Texas Hold’em (NLHE). 
Participants first read detailed task instructions and indicated having understood them. In 
NLHE, an informed decision to bluff depends on the previous betting actions of one’s 
opponents during a given hand (cf. glossary). We emulated typical betting sequences in 
online NLHE games for five players by presenting each task as an animated sequence of 
automated betting actions beginning pre-flop, and ending on the river (cf. glossary), upon 
which participants made a decision to either bet or check. See 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/~yanj2/poker/ for all betting sequence animations as they were 
presented to participants. We consulted professional poker players to ensure the betting 
sequences were as realistic as possible for online NLHE. We closely emulated the graphical 
outlook of the tables used by the most popular online poker site, www.pokerstars.net. See the 
Supplementary Materials section for further details. 
Participants made one decision against each opponent, and each decision was made in 





were not “in the hand”). If the participant decided to bet, s/he first indicated the amount to 
bet, and then whether or not the bet was a bluff (“Was your bet a bluff?” 1: “Yes”, 2: “No”, 3: 
“I don’t know”)5. To reduce unwanted noise in the data, only the bets that participants 
reported to be bluffs were analyzed as actual bluffing decisions. However, in each task, at the 
time of betting, the participant’s hand was so weak it would typically not make sense to bet 
unless it was to bluff. 
Two DVs were calculated to assess the following questions. 1: How frequently do 
participants bluff? 2: If participants decide to bluff, what is their average bluffsize? The first 
DV was labelled Bluffing Frequency and calculated as the total number of bluffing decisions 
(range = 0 – 4) divided by four (M = 0.45, SD = 0.23, range = 0 – 1). The second DV was 
labelled Average Bluffsize and calculated as the total size of the bluffs divided by the total 
number of bluffing decisions (M = 202, SD = 64.7, range = 20 – 455). For Average Bluffsize, 
values of zero were not included in the analyses, since participants whose average bluffsize 
was zero (n = 38) did not make any decisions to bluff (this also normalized the variable 
distribution). Thus, in subsequent analyses the sample sizes for Average Bluffsize and 
Bluffing Frequency are different. 
2.3.3.2 Sensitivity to slow-play. This scale was developed for the current study. It 
measures the extent to which individuals experience negative emotions in poker when they 
lose after being slow-played against. In other words, it measures emotional sensitivity to 
“getting slow-played”. The scale consists of 3 items anchored from 1 (“Completely 
disagree”) to 7 (“Completely agree”). The items are: 1) “If I get slow-played and lose, I feel 
my opponent is playing ‘dirty’”; 2) “If I get slow-played and lose, I feel angry”; 3) “If I get 
																																								 																				
5 The only way to ascertain whether participants believed they were bluffing or not was to ask them directly. 
The mechanics of the game do not allow for constructing bluffing scenarios where betting is “by definition” 






slow-played and lose, I feel exploited“. The scale had an acceptable inter-item reliability (M = 
2.48, SD = 1.36, range = 1 – 7; Cronbach’s α = .69).  
 The model residuals were heteroscedastic in the analyses with Bluffing Frequency or 
Sensitivity to slow-play as the DV. Thus, we employed heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
error estimators in OLS regression (Hayes & Cai, 2007). 
3. Results 
H1a and b were tested by employing multiple regression to assess the associations 
between Machiavellianism and bluffing. Machiavellianism was positively associated with 
average bluffsize (B = 11.36, t(450) = 3.1, 95% CI [4.17, 18.5], p = .002, adj. R2 = .019; 
controlled for demographics: B = 7.86, t(415) = 2.1, 95% CI [0.32, 15.4],  p = .041, adj. R2 = 
.059), but not with bluffing frequency (B = 0.01, t(488) = 0.971, p = ns). Thus, H1b was 
supported (high Machs exhibited higher bluffsizes than low Machs), but H1a was not.  
We also entered the four MPS subscales in two multiple regression models, predicting 
both DVs separately, controlling for demographics. Both models were statistically significant 
(average bluffsize: F(8, 412) = 4.53, p < .001, adj. R2 = .063; bluffing frequency: F(8, 450) = 
8.26, p < .001, adj. R2 = .11). However, only two of the four MPS subscales were implicated 
in bluffing: Desire for control positively predicted bluffing frequency (B = 0.028, 95% CI 
[0.01, 0.05], p = .002), and distrust of others positively predicted average bluffsize (B = 7.12, 







Table 1. Multiple regression analyses predicting bluffing behaviour. Analyses are presented 
separately for two DVs: Bluffing Frequency and Average Bluffsize ($). Hypothesis-relevant 
cells are highlighted. 
 
 DV: Bluffing Frequency (N=458)  DV: Average Bluffsize (N=420) 
Variable B t p  B t p 
Constant 0.796    287.69   
Distrust of Others -0.012 -1.23 ns  7.12 2.40 .017 
Desire for Status -0.005 -0.59 ns  -1.67 -0.73 ns 
Desire for Control 0.028 3.11 .002  0.55 0.20 ns 
Amorality -0.013 -1.24 ns  2.90 0.95 ns 
Age -0.003 -2.30 .022  -0.96 -2.37 .018 
Gender -0.218 -5.37 <.001  -47.90 -3.40 <.001 
Education -0.012 -1.29 ns  -3.68 -1.27 ns 
Income 0.010 1.52 ns  1.92 1.0 ns 
adj. R2 .11    .063   
F 8.26  <.001  4.52  <.001 
Note. Participants with missing data on demographics are omitted from the analyses. The 
model predicting Average Bluffsize does not include data from participants who did not bluff 
at all. Gender is calculated at Male = 0, Female = 1.  
 
H2 was tested by employing multiple regression to assess the associations between 
Machiavellianism and sensitivity to slow-play. Contrary to H2, Machiavellianism was 
positively associated with sensitivity to slow-play (controlling for demographics: B = 0.53, 
t(453) = 7.05, 95% CI [0.38, 0.68],  p < .001, adj. R2 = .10): High Machs reported feeling 
more distraught than low Machs by getting slow-played. 
Again, we entered the four MPS subscales separately in a multiple regression model, 
predicting sensitivity to slow-play while controlling for demographics. The model was 
statistically significant (F(8, 450) = 7.68, p < .001, adj. R2 = .11). Two MPS subscales 





CI [0.10, 0.34],  p <.001) and amorality (B = 0.22, t(450) = 3.72, 95% CI [0.11, 0.34],  p 
<.001), see Table 2.	
Table 2. Multiple regression analyses predicting sensitivity to slow-play. 
 DV: Sensitivity to slow-play (N=458) 
Variable B t p 
Constant 2.37   
Distrust of Others 0.22 3.68 <.001 
Desire for Status 
 
0.07 1.43 ns 
Desire for Control 
 
0.02 0.39 ns 
Amorality 
 
0.22 3.72 <.001 
Age 0.01 1.51 ns 
Gender -0.06 -0.24 ns 
Education 0.01 0.20 ns 
Income -0.07 -1.91 .057 
adj. R2 .11   
F 7.68  <.001 
Note. Participants with missing data on demographics are omitted from the analyses. Gender 

















We assessed the association between trait Machiavellianism and ethically acceptable 
forms of strategic deception using poker as an instrument. The results showed that 
Machiavellianism (as measured by MPS) and its subscales were implicated in both bluffing 
frequency and average bluffsizes, and also in emotional sensitivity to getting slow-played.  
4.1 Machiavellianism and Bluffing 
Higher scores in MPS predisposed participants to bluff in higher average sizes but not 
in higher frequency. When the MPS subscales were analyzed separately, only the subscale 
“distrust of others” positively predicted average bluffsize, but “desire for control” positively 
predicted also bluffing frequency. 
In the MPS, desire for control relates to how much individuals enjoy giving the orders 
and having control in interpersonal situations. Distrust of others, in turn, relates to the 
propensity of not wanting to show weakness, and of taking advantage of weakness displayed 
by others. General poker strategy advises against showing weakness in the game, because it 
can be easily exploited, and bluffing is sometimes referred to as a means to “control the 
action” (Sklansky, 1999). One way to show weakness in poker is to consistently bet in small 
amounts (making “weak” bets instead of “strong” ones). Likewise, bluffing in too small 
amounts can be viewed as a weak and exploitable strategy, because it is mathematically more 
reasonable for opponents to call down small bets than large ones. Therefore, the links 
between desire for control and bluffing frequency on the one hand, and distrust of others and 







4.2 Machiavellianism and Sensitivity to Slow-play 
Slow-playing involves calling multiple bets to “lure” opponents into a trap, whereas 
bluffing involves only one decision to either bluff or not. A behavioural slow-playing task 
would be difficult to keep identical across subjects, and thus too complex to be implemented 
in an online study. Instead, for simplicity, we evaluated one single aspect of slow-playing, 
namely, emotional sensitivity to slow-play by employing a novel but unvalidated self-report 
instrument.  
Contrary to our hypothesis, high Machs were more emotionally sensitive than low 
Machs to getting slow-played, with the MPS subscales “distrust of others” and “amorality” 
being most saliently implicated. Interestingly, “amorality” positively predicted sensitivity to 
slow-play, but not bluffing behaviour: participants’ self-reported propensity to act amorally 
increased their likelihood of feeling distraught by being the target of a slow-play. Bluffing is 
an act of deception, whereas getting slow-played is being the target of deception. Acting 
deceptively in poker is unlikely considered unethical by the players, given that deception is 
the norm. However, being the target of deception might trigger negative feelings of being 
exploited or manipulated, and these feelings seem to be more pronounced in individuals who 
have a disposition for amoral behaviour. 
4.3 Significance of Findings, Future Studies and Conclusions 
In a seminal paper, Wilson, Near and Miller (1996) called attention to building a more 
cohesive conceptual framework around Machiavellianism. According to them, 
“Machiavellianism has become the symbol for manipulative strategies of social conduct, but 
the psychological literature on Machiavellianism has not done justice to the importance of 
the subject, in part because it lacks a conceptual framework for guiding empirical research.” 





example, only a few studies have evaluated how Machiavellianism affects actual decision-
making behaviour in economic games (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & Smith, 2002; Meyer, 
1992), and none of them have evaluated how Machiavellianism affects strategic deception in 
a naturalistic environment. 
Findings from studies employing economic games (Bereczkei et al., 2013; Burks et 
al., 2003; Meyer, 1992; Spitzer et al., 2007) suggest that high Machs are more prone than low 
Machs to engage in “emotionless” (“rational”) deliberation to assess the pros and cons of 
manipulation and deception from a self-interested perspective. Due to this, high Machs have 
been dubbed as true homines economici – gamesmen who strategically aim to maximize their 
profits, often at the expense of others (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2003). In a similar vein, to be a 
successful poker player, a general advice is to be the one controlling the action by being 
fearless and forcing your opponents to make the tough decisions (Sklansky, 1999). Perhaps 
high Machs are prone to engage in both ethical and unethical deception but for different 
reasons: High Machs might have an increased propensity to bluff not because they are amoral 
or desire status in life (which are implicated in unethical deception), but because they dislike 
showing weakness, and generally desire to be in control – traits fit for “true gamesmen”. 
Although high Machs have typically been considered to be more “cold-blooded” than 
low Machs (Wilson et al., 1996), our results indicate that – contrary to the hypothesis – in 
situations where high Machs get slow-played this pattern is reversed. For high Machs, being 
the target of manipulation seems to elicit strong negative emotions. If using deception in 
poker is viewed as a display of strength, then being manipulated by it might signal weakness. 
High Machs generally like to feel in control and dislike showing weakness, and might thus be 
prone to feeling distraught when someone else displays control over them – that is, when 





Due to these unexpected findings, we performed post-hoc analyses by correlating our 
participants’ scores on MPS, sensitivity to slow-play and two exploratory instruments; one 
measuring emotional sensitivity to poker losses (Sensitivity to Losses scale; Palomäki et al., 
2014) and the other measuring competitiveness. These measures were not directly related to 
poker deception and thus not pertinent to our hypotheses a priori, but we looked into them 
for alternative explanations.  
Firstly, it is possible that high Machs are generally more competitive than low Machs 
and thus dislike being slow-played (or “out-played”). However, this hypothesis was not 
supported: Controlling for participants’ self-reported level of competitiveness did not affect 
the results (cf. the Supplementary Materials section, table S3).  
Second, recent evidence has questioned the view of high Machs as cold-blooded 
individuals. For example, Szijjarto and Bereczkei (2015) reported that high Machs were less 
emotionally stable than low Machs, having a tendency of losing their coolness in some 
situations. High Machs have also been reported having trouble in subtly expressing their own 
emotions and empathizing with others (Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Szijjarto & 
Bereczkei, 2015). In fact, such deficits might make it easier for high Machs to deceive others: 
it is possible that high Machs experience strong emotions frequently, but manage to conceal 
these emotions from others due to being unable to express and share them (McIlwain, 2003). 
In line with these studies, we observed a positive correlation between sensitivity to (poker) 
losses and Machiavellianism: losing in poker was emotionally more stressful to high Machs 
than low Machs (cf. the Supplementary Materials section, table S4). Consequently, an 
interesting venue for future research is to evaluate whether being the target of a successful 
bluff elicits strong emotional reactions from high Mach players. This could happen when a 






Our results are also in line with the findings by Jonason et al. (2014) showing 
Machiavellianism is partly characterized by the use of strategic deception, such as telling 
white lies, which is different from deceiving out of spite or due to lack of ethical 
consideration. Although white lies and bluffing in poker are very different types of deception, 
they might share a conceptual link via “desire for control”. Moreover, employing a 
behavioural measure instead of a self-report one makes our study unique, and our results 
further complement the previous findings by extending their implications6. Future studies 
should test the hypothesis that high Machs are primarily motivated to tell non-malicious lies 
not because of empathy, but rather due to a desire to control the situation and due to a 
strategic evaluation of the benefits of lying.  
Our study faces limitations. Because the study was performed online, we were unable 
to control for distractions participants might have faced. Our participants were mostly male, 
which limits our ability to generalize the results to a non-poker playing population. However, 
our sample was diverse in terms of education, income and age, which may not be the case in 
typical psychological studies sampling primarily student populations (and often within a 
single university). In the bluffing task, participants also did not play an actual poker game or 
wage their own money, which reduces ecological validity. Nonetheless, we mitigated these 
limitations by emulating an online poker environment used by the most popular online poker 
site (www.pokerstars.net), thus ensuring the highest possible ecological validity achievable in 
such experiments. Also the feedback from our participants was positive: many of them 
regarded our tasks as both highly realistic and easy to understand. 
																																								 																				
6 Unlike white lies, poker deception has direct real world monetary implications. In the supplementary materials 
section, we have provided theoretical expected monetary value calculations based on bluffing frequency and 
size. These give an outline for how specific types of personality characteristics might have actual monetary 






 In conclusion, we are the first to show that online poker can be used as a naturalistic 
behavioural tool to better understand the psychology of strategic deception, which had 
previously proven to be a hard task in research on Machiavellianism. Given that human acts 
of deception are frequent and not always malicious, understanding why and when we deceive 
is important. To this end, deception should be evaluated from both unethical and ethical 
perspectives. 
Our results illustrate a conceptual link between unethical and ethical deception via 
Machiavellianism. Of particular interest is the Machiavellian subtrait “desire for control”, 
which could be a relevant factor in explaining high Machs’ increased propensity for strategic 
deception. In poker, deception is a means to control the action – to make sure you are the one 
in charge. This contention has also wider implications in offline settings beyond poker. For 
example, desire for control might be the reason why high Machs tell white lies frequently in 
interpersonal relationships, possibly to avoid quarrels. This illustrates one way, but not the 
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